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Peter-Paul Verbeek

Peter-Paul Verbeek

  • Peter-Paul Verbeek (1970) is professor of philosophy of technology at the Department of Philosophy, University of Twe... moreedit
According to Max Weber, the “fate of our times” is characterized by a “dis- enchantment of the world.” The scienti c ambition of rationalization and intellectual- ization, as well as the attempt to master nature through technology, will... more
According to Max Weber, the “fate of our times” is characterized by a “dis- enchantment of the world.” The scienti c ambition of rationalization and intellectual- ization, as well as the attempt to master nature through technology, will greatly limit experiences of and openness for the transcendent, i.e., that which is beyond our control. Insofar as transcendence is a central aspect of virtually every religion and all religious experiences, the development of science and technology will, according to the Weberian assertion, also limit the scope of religion. In this paper, we will re ect on the relations between technology and transcendence from the perspective of technological mediation theory. We will show that the fact that we are able to technologically intervene in the world and ourselves does not imply that we can completely control the rules of life. Technological interference in nature is only possible if the structures and laws that enable us to do that are recognized and to a certain extent obeyed, which indicates that technological power cannot exist without accepting a transcendent order in which one operates. Rather than excluding transcendence, technology mediates our relation to it.
Research Interests:
The theory of technological mediation aims to take technological artifacts seriously, recognizing the constitutive role they play in how we experience the world, act in it, and how we are constituted as (moral) subjects. Its quest for a... more
The theory of technological mediation aims to take technological artifacts seriously, recognizing the constitutive role they play in how we experience the world, act in it, and how we are constituted as (moral) subjects. Its quest for a compatible ethics has led it to Foucault’s “care of the self,” i.e., a transformation of the self by oneself through self-discipline. In this regard, technologies have been interpreted as power structures to which one can relate through Foucaultian “technologies of the self” or ascetic practices. However, this leaves unexplored how concrete technologies can actually support the process of self-care. This paper explores this possibility by examining one such technology: a gamified To-Do list app. Doing so, it first shows that despite the apparent straightforwardness of gamification, confrontation and shame play an important role in how the app motivates me to do better. Second, inspired by Ihde’s schema of human-technology relations, it presents different ways in which the app may confront me with myself. Subsequently, it accounts for the motivation and shame that this technologically mediated confrontation with myself invokes through a Levinasian account of ethical subjectivity. In so doing, it also shows how Levinas’ phenomenology implies a responsibility for self-care and how nonhuman, technological others may still call me to responsibility. It concludes with a reflection on the role of gamification in technologically mediated subjectivation and some implications for design.
After several technological revolutions in which technologies became ever more present in our daily lives, the digital technologies that are currently being developed are actually fading away from sight. Information and Communication... more
After several technological revolutions in which technologies became ever more present in our daily lives, the digital technologies that are currently being developed are actually fading away from sight. Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are not only embedded in devices that we explicitly 'use' but increasingly become an intrinsic part of the material environment in which we live. How to conceptualize the role of these new technological environments in human existence? And how to anticipate the ways in which these technologies will mediate our everyday lives? In order to answer these questions, we draw on two approaches that each offers a framework to conceptualize these new technological environments: Postphenomenology and Material Engagement Theory. As we will show, each on their own, these approaches fail to do justice to the new environmental role of technology and its implications for human existence. But by bringing together Postphenomenology's account of technological mediation and Material Engagement Theory's account of engaging with environments, it becomes possible to sufficiently account for the new environmental workings of technology. To do justice to these new workings of environmental technologies, we introduce and develop the concept of Technological Environmentality.
Engineering ethics and science and technology studies (STS) have until now developed as separate enterprises. The authors argue that they can learn a lot from each other. STS insights can help make engineering ethics open the black box of... more
Engineering ethics and science and technology studies (STS) have until now developed as separate enterprises. The authors argue that they can learn a lot from each other. STS insights can help make engineering ethics open the black box of technology and help discern ethical ...
This paper analyzes the moral relevance of technological artifacts and its possible role in ethical theory, by taking the postphenomenological approach that has developed around the work of Don Ihde into the domain of ethics. By... more
This paper analyzes the moral relevance of technological artifacts and its possible role in ethical theory, by taking the postphenomenological approach that has developed around the work of Don Ihde into the domain of ethics. By elaborating a postphenomenological analysis of the mediating role of ultrasound in moral decisions about abortion, the article argues that technologies embody morality, and help
One of the greatest dangers to pragmatism is relativism, as I freely translate Glenn McGee's statement in his contribution to this volume. Pragmatist bioethics too easily sets aside questions about the foundations of knowledge.... more
One of the greatest dangers to pragmatism is relativism, as I freely translate Glenn McGee's statement in his contribution to this volume. Pragmatist bioethics too easily sets aside questions about the foundations of knowledge. Ethical decisions are unavoidably made ...
An elderly woman who is an acquaintance of one of us has a small wooden dwelling on an allotment, much like so many in the Netherlands. Electricity is not available. With the decline in prices of Photovoltaic solar energy, it became... more
An elderly woman who is an acquaintance of one of us has a small wooden dwelling on an allotment, much like so many in the Netherlands. Electricity is not available. With the decline in prices of Photovoltaic solar energy, it became worthwhile for her to buy a PV unit, so ...
Since 1995, a group of scholars from different nationalities and disciplines has come together every year to discuss normative and interdisciplinary issues regarding science, technology, and their social roles and impact. Members of the... more
Since 1995, a group of scholars from different nationalities and disciplines has come together every year to discuss normative and interdisciplinary issues regarding science, technology, and their social roles and impact. Members of the group share an interest in systems theory ...
... Kenmerkend voor het modernisme, zoals Bruno Latour en Martin Heidegger hebben betoogd, is een radicale scheiding ... Wie een boek leest, een gesprek voert of een maaltijd kookt, om maar een paar voorbeelden te noemen, is niet als... more
... Kenmerkend voor het modernisme, zoals Bruno Latour en Martin Heidegger hebben betoogd, is een radicale scheiding ... Wie een boek leest, een gesprek voert of een maaltijd kookt, om maar een paar voorbeelden te noemen, is niet als subject betrok-ken op objecten, maar ...

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